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Federal income tax policy affects the cost of 
homeownership for many households. Popular 
discussions of the favorable tax treatment of 
owner-occupied housing usually focus on the 
tax-deductibility of mortgage interest and prop-
erty tax payments, as well as the specialized tax 
rules that affect housing capital gains. Academic 
discussions, in contrast, emphasize the exclusion 
of the imputed rental income on owner-occupied 
housing as the key tax benefit for homeowners. 
This paper summarizes the current distribution 
of the tax benefits associated with the mortgage 
interest and property tax deductions. It contrasts 
this with the distribution of tax benefits asso-
ciated with the current tax regime for imputed 
rental income relative to one that taxes home-
owners as if they were landlords. It also reports 
how removing either deduction, or taxing home- 
owners as landlords, would affect the user cost 
of owner-occupied housing.
I.  Patterns of Homeownership, Mortgage 
Borrowing, and Itemization Status
Variation across age and income groups in 
the tax savings associated with the mortgage 
interest and property tax deductions results 
primarily from differences in homeownership 
rates, itemization rates, and the financing of 
homes. We illustrate these differences using 
the sample of nonfarm households in the 2004 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF 
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By James Poterba and Todd Sinai*
sample includes 22,595 household observations, 
based on five replicates for each of 4,519 under-
lying households. The subsample we analyze 
excludes 1,475 observations corresponding to 
households that live on a farm or a ranch or in 
a mobile home, 812 additional observations for 
households headed by someone under the age of 
25, 64 additional observations that report hav-
ing mortgages but pay no mortgage interest, 11 
additional observations with loan-to-value ratios 
above 1.5, and 64 additional observations with 
inexplicably high estimated marginal tax rates. 
This leaves a subsample of 20,169 observations. 
We estimate each household’s marginal federal 
income tax rates for the 2003 tax year using the 
NBER TAXSIM federal and state income tax 
calculators and Kevin Moore’s (2003) mapping 
of SCF data to tax return items.
Table 1 reports summary information on 
housing market attributes for several subgroups 
of the population, stratifying by age of the 
household head and household income in 2003. 
Household income is defined as Adjusted Gross 
Income plus the following items: income from 
nontaxable investments, an estimate of employer 
contributions for FICA, payments from unem-
ployment insurance and workers compensa-
tion, gross Social Security income, and any 
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) preference 
items that can be estimated from the SCF.
The first panel of Table 1 shows the percent-
age of homeowners who itemize on their federal 
income tax returns—a precondition for claim-
ing the mortgage interest or property tax deduc-
tions. We categorize a household as an itemizer if 
TAXSIM estimates that the household’s federal 
income tax liability would be lower if it itemized 
than if it claimed the standard deduction. More 
than 98 percent of homeowners with income in 
excess of $125,000 claim itemized deductions, 
compared with only 23 percent of those with 
incomes below $40,000. The TAXSIM-based 
imputed itemization rate is 63.1 percent, which 
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compares with 63.3 percent using self-reported 
itemization status from the SCF. The aggregate 
similarity masks differences for the young-
est and oldest households making less than 
$125,000: for the under-35 group, our imputed 
itemization rate is about 20 percentage points 
higher than the self-reported value. The differ-
ence for the over-65 group is of roughly equal 
magnitude, but in the opposite direction.
The second panel in Table 1 summarizes 
the loan-to-value ratio for homeowners in each 
age-income category. The average loan-to-value 
Table 1—Homeownership, Itemization Status, and House Value
Annual household income ($)
Age of household head ,40K 40–75K 75–125K 125–250K 250K1 All
Panel A: Homeowner characteristics
Fraction who itemize
25–35  54.3  74.4  97.3  95.7  100.0  78.5
35–50  51.8  77.8  91.7  99.9  100.0  82.5
50–65  33.7  64.4  83.1  98.7  100.0  70.6
. 65  3.8  37.5  55.8  92.0  99.6  22.9
All  23.4  66.1  85.5  98.4  99.9  63.1
Loan-to-value ratio (percent)
25–35  60.5  72.8  71.2  67.3  57.7  68.9
35–50  51.2  60.0  55.3  53.2  36.7  55.0
50–65  29.3  29.6  37.3  34.8  29.5  32.5
. 65  9.8  13.5  18.4  12.7  7.2  11.6
All  25.9  44.9  47.4  42.6  29.4  38.6
Mean value of owner-occupied home (000s)
25–35  $119.4  147.5  259.1  343.3  674.7  194.6
35–50  126.7  188.1  253.7  422.3  993.0  273.8
50–65  156.1  208.0  264.6  428.2  1,155.0  313.4
.65  159.8  266.8  283.5  504.5  1,060.6  233.8
All  149.6  201.7  261.8  427.8  1,072.0  266.2
Panel B: Tax saving from current law
Average tax saving from mortgage interest deduction 
25–35  $208  $592  $1,817  $3,603  $7,077  $1,155
35–50  216  719  1,483  3,599  5,833  1,598
50–65  143  476  1,074  2,039  6,348  1,226
. 65  5  134  351  914  1,435  149
All  91  523  1,264  2,703  5,459  1,060
Average tax saving from property tax deduction 
25–35  109  229  619  1,009  1,970  393
35–50  125  299  559  1,179  2,939  618
50–65  129  298  515  1,095  3,120  647
. 65  75  208  350  1,076  2,548  242
All  99  271  529  1,125  2,937  504
Average tax saving from exclusion of net imputed rental Income
25–35  655  718  1,849  2,992  6,417  1271
35–50  650  922  1,870  3,881  9,529  2,054
50–65  561  1,253  2,000  3,885  11,163  2,420
. 65  418  1,812  2,083  4,206  9,976  1,299
All  511  1,146  1,935  3,861  10,293  1,879
Notes: Authors’ calculations using 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances and Moore’s (2003) interface between NBER 
TAXSIM program and the SCF. Averages are weighted using the SCF’s replicate weights. Net Imputed Rental Income (bot-
tom panel) is 3.5 percent of house value.
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ratio for households over the age of 65 with an 
income of less than $40,000 is 9.8 percent, com-
pared with 55 (69) percent for all households 
with heads between the ages of 35 and 50 (25 
and 35). The third panel shows the mean value 
of primary homes for homeowners in various 
income-age cells. There is a strong positive rela-
tionship between household income and house 
value. Home value averages $201,700 for fami-
lies with incomes of $40,000–75,000, compared 
with $427,800 for those with incomes between 
$125,000 and $250,000. Mortgage interest and 
property tax deductions, as well as the tax sav-
ing from excluding imputed rental income from 
the tax base, tend to rise with house value.
II.  User Costs and Imputed Rental Income
The neoclassical investment model, which 
focuses on the user cost of capital, is a stan-
dard tool for studying housing demand and for 
analyzing the equilibrium value of the imputed 
rental income accruing to homeowners under 
various tax regimes. Poterba (1992), Joseph 
Gyourko and Sinai (2004), Charles Himmelberg, 
Christopher Mayer, and Sinai (2005) (hereafter 
HMS), and many others have used this approach 
to describe homeowners’ marginal costs of pur-
chasing additional housing services. If owner-
occupied housing were taxed in the same way as 
other durable investments, homeowners would 
be taxed on their rental income but they would 
be able to deduct interest payments, deprecia-
tion and maintenance expenses, property taxes, 
and other costs of providing housing services.
Our approach to estimating the user cost 
of owner-occupied housing follows most pre-
vious studies, except in our treatment of the 
risk-adjusted cost of funds. Many past studies 
have used a loan-to-value weighted average of 
the mortgage interest rate and a return on an 
 alternative asset to measure this cost. Neither 
return measure is an appropriate component of 
the cost of funds. HMS (2005) note that mortgage 
interest rates include not only the risk-adjusted 
required return on a housing loan, but also a pre-
mium for the refinancing and default options that 
the lender provides to the borrower. The cost of 
these financial options should be removed from 
the cost of funds. In addition, the returns on alter-
native assets do not reflect the risk premium that 
investments in owner-occupied homes should 
command. Our approach follows some previous 
studies, such as Poterba (1992), in adding a risk 
premium component to the user cost calculation. 
Homeowners bear both asset-class risk and idio-
syncratic, house-specific risk.
We define the appropriate pre-tax cost of funds 
as the risk-free medium-term interest rate plus a 
risk premium. We measure the former using the 
ten-year Treasury bond rate, rT , and assume a 
pre-tax risk premium of 200 basis points. This 
value follows earlier studies but is admittedly 
not well grounded in a calculation of risk and 
return trade-offs. The loan-to-value ratio does 
not affect the cost of funds in our expression for 
the user cost. We recognize that the marginal 
income tax rate applicable to mortgage interest 
and property tax deductions may differ from 
that on investment income if a taxpayer does not 
itemize. We define the user cost, c, as
(1)  c 5 31 2 5tdedl 1 ty 11 2 l 2 6 4 rT 
 2 tdedl 1rM 2 rT2 1 11 2 ty 2b
 1 m 1 11 2 tded 2tprop – πe .
In this expression, rM denotes the mort-
gage interest rate, l is the loan-to-value ratio, 
tdedl 1rM 2 rT2 is the tax subsidy to the default 
and refinancing options that the homeowner pur-
chases by paying rM rather than rT as a mortgage 
interest rate, b is the pre-tax risk premium, m is 
the cost of depreciation and maintenance, set to 
0.025, tprop equals the national average property 
tax rate (0.0104), and pe is the expected nominal 
appreciation rate of owner-occupied homes.
The user cost depends on two income tax 
parameters: tded and ty , the marginal income 
tax rates on itemized deductions and investment 
income, respectively. We assume that capital 
gains on homes are untaxed. Since 1997, married 
(single) homeowners have been able to realize 
$500,000 ($250,000) of capital gains tax-free 
after a holding period of two years. Relatively 
few accruing housing capital gains are likely 
to face taxation under this regime. In 2003, 
the base year for our user cost calculations, the 
ten-year Treasury yield was 4.01 percent, the 
average mortgage interest rate was 5.82 percent, 
and the Livingston Survey showed expected 
CPI inflation of 1.4 percent. Real house price 
inflation between 1980 and 2002, measured by 
averaging state-level inflation rates calculated 
from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
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Oversight (OFHEO) indices, was 0.73 percent 
per year. We therefore assume an average nomi-
nal house price inflation rate of 2.13 15 0.73 1 
1.402 percent.
The user cost evaluated at the marginal tax 
rates corresponding to the “last dollar” of mort-
gage interest and property tax deductions, and 
of investment income, determines the marginal 
cost of consuming one more unit of owner-
 occupied housing. In equilibrium, each house-
hold’s imputed rental income 1R2 per unit of 
housing capital divided by the asset price of a 
unit of housing capital 1P2 equals the user cost: 
R/P 5 c. Our analysis suggests that the ratio of 
rental income to house value 1R/P2 varies across 
age and income groups. Whether household-
specific variation in imputed rent values should 
be considered when calculating the tax conse-
quences of taxing imputed rent is an open ques-
tion. Our illustrative calculations of the value of 
imputed rent assume a single 1R/P2 ratio for all 
owner-occupiers.
Table 2 presents our estimates of average “last 
dollar” user costs in 2003, stratified by house-
hold age and income. The first panel shows esti-
mates corresponding to the actual 2003 tax law. 
The average user cost is 6.0 percent, but the val-
ues for various subsamples range from 4.7 to 7.2 
percent. The progressive structure of the income 
tax generates nontrivial variation in the user cost 
across subcategories. For those with the highest 
household incomes—more than $250,000—the 
user cost averages 5.0 percent, while the user 
cost averages 5.6 percent for households with 
incomes of $75,000–$125,000 and 6.9 percent 
for households with incomes below $40,000. 
There is a 38 percent range between user costs 
for the highest and lowest income groups.
The second panel of Table 2 considers the elim-
ination of the tax-deductibility of mortgage inter-
est payments. In this case, the user cost becomes
(2)  c9 5 11 2 ty 11 2 l 2 2 rT 
 1 11 2 ty 2b 1 m
 1 11 2 tded 2tprop – πe .
This equation assumes that the loan-to-value 
ratio (l) does not adjust to the elimination of 
mortgage interest deductibility, even though, 
with this reform, those with both financial assets 
and mortgages would be borrowing at the pretax 
rate but investing at the after-tax rate of return. 
Martin Gervais and Manish Pandey (forthcom-
ing) note that changing the tax treatment of 
mortgage interest might have little impact on 
the user cost if households altered their loan-
to-value ratios in response. We are not aware 
of definitive estimates of how changing the tax 
treatment of mortgage interest would affect loan-
to-value ratios, but this is clearly a key parameter 
for evaluating the current tax expenditure. 
The results in Table 2 suggest that repealing 
the mortgage interest deduction, with no change 
in loan-to-value ratios, would raise the average 
user cost by 7 percent, from 6.0 to 6.4 percent. 
The effect would be largest on the high-income, 
young homeowners with high loan-to-value 
ratios. These households may have limited hold-
ings of other financial assets, so their capacity 
to adjust their loan-to-value ratios may be muted 
relative to other households.
The third panel of Table 2 considers elimina-
tion of the property tax deduction. The average 
impact on the user cost is an increase of two-tenths 
of one percentage point, from 6.0 to 6.2 percent. 
There is less variation across subgroups for this 
tax reform than for elimination of the mortgage 
interest deduction, because property taxes as a 
share of house value do not vary with age or 
income as much as mortgage interest payments 
as a share of house value. The effects of repeal-
ing either the mortgage interest or the property 
tax deduction are greater at higher income levels 
than at lower levels, because of these taxpayers’ 
higher marginal income tax rates. For those with 
incomes of $250,000 and above, for example, the 
average user cost rises from 5.1 percent to 5.4 per-
cent when the property tax deduction is repealed.
The final panel of Table 2 examines how the 
user cost would change if homeowners were 
taxed as landlords. The specific tax reform we 
consider includes gross rental income in adjusted 
gross income but allows deductions for interest 
payments, property taxes, maintenance, and eco-
nomic depreciation. We assume that the current 
tax treatment of capital gains on owner-occupied 
housing would continue. In this case, the equilib-
rium condition for investment in an owner-occu-
pied house would be
(3)   11 2 ty 2 1R/P2 5 11 2 ty 2
 3 1rT 1 m 1 tprop 1 b) 
 2 tyl 1rM 2 rT2 2 pe.
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Solving for the equilibrium value of 1R/P2 , which 
equals the user cost from (1), yields
(4)  1R/P2 5 rT 1 m 1 tprop 1 b
  2 3ty / 11 2 ty 2 4l 1rM 2 rT2 
 2 pe / 11 2 ty 2 .
User costs would rise substantially if owners 
were taxed as if they were landlords. The aver-
age user cost in this case is 6.6 percent, and the 
increase is especially large for higher-income 
households. Households can choose the amount 
of housing capital to hold, thereby altering their 
marginal value 1R2 of another unit of hous-
ing services. Changes in user costs like those 
reported in Table 2 translate into changes in 
housing demand. They would affect real house 
prices and the quantity of housing in a man-
ner that depends on housing market conditions 
as described in Edward Glaeser and Gyourko 
(2007).
III.  The Distribution of Tax Benefits from 
Housing Tax Expenditures
The last three panels in Table 1 provide 
information on how changes in tax rules would 
affect the tax liabilities of current homeown-
ers. The table reports averages for homeown-
ers in each age-income subcategory. The first 
panel shows that while the average homeowner 
saves $1,060 as a result of the mortgage interest 
deduction, the benefits of this tax expenditure 
are much greater for higher-income households. 
This is a result both of larger mortgages and of 
higher marginal tax rates. The highest mortgage 
 interest deductions are found among young, 
high-income households with expensive houses. 
Table 2—Last-Dollar User Cost of Owner-Occupied Housing under Various Tax Policies
Income ($) ,40K 40–75K 75–125K 125–250K 250K1 All
Age of household head 2003 Law
25–35 0.064 0.060 0.053 0.049 0.047 0.058
35–50 0.065 0.060 0.054 0.050 0.050 0.057
50–65 0.067 0.060 0.056 0.052 0.050 0.058
. 65 0.072 0.065 0.063 0.056 0.053 0.068
All 0.069 0.061 0.056 0.051 0.050 0.060
Repeal of mortgage interest deduction
25–35 0.067 0.066 0.063 0.060 0.058 0.065
35–50 0.068 0.065 0.062 0.059 0.058 0.063
50–65 0.068 0.063 0.060 0.058 0.056 0.062
. 65 0.072 0.066 0.064 0.058 0.055 0.069
All 0.070 0.065 0.062 0.058 0.057 0.064
Repeal of property tax deduction
25–35 0.065 0.062 0.055 0.052 0.049 0.060
35–50 0.066 0.061 0.057 0.052 0.052 0.059
50–65 0.068 0.061 0.058 0.054 0.052 0.060
. 65 0.073 0.066 0.064 0.058 0.055 0.069
All 0.070 0.062 0.058 0.054 0.053 0.062
Apply landlord tax treatment to owner-occupied housing
25–35 0.067 0.065 0.061 0.057 0.055 0.064
35–50 0.068 0.065 0.062 0.059 0.060 0.064
50–65 0.070 0.067 0.064 0.061 0.060 0.065
. 65 0.073 0.069 0.068 0.066 0.063 0.071
All 0.071 0.066 0.063 0.060 0.061 0.066
Notes: Authors’ calculations using 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances and Moore’s (2003) interface between NBER 
TAXSIM program and the SCF. Averages are weighted using the SCF’s replicate weights.
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Among households under the age of 50 with 
incomes between $125,000 and $250,000, for 
example, the average tax saving from the mort-
gage interest deduction is roughly $3,600. For 
25–35 year old homeowners with over $250,000 
in income, the mortgage interest tax saving is 
nearly twice this level: $7,077. Reflecting lower 
loan-to-value ratios among the elderly, the aver-
age mortgage interest tax saving for homeown-
ers over the age of 65 is only $149, and even 
among those with incomes of $250,000 or more, 
it is only $1,435.
The distribution of the subsidies in Table 1 
differs from the pattern of changes in user cost 
in Table 2 because it depends on the average 
tax benefit from homeownership, while the user 
cost calculation focuses on the marginal cost of 
additional housing. Since housing deductions 
frequently drive itemization, there can be large 
gaps between average and marginal tax rates on 
mortgage interest and property tax deductions.
The next panel shows that the average income 
tax saving from the property tax deduction also 
varies across age and income categories, but by 
less than the saving from the mortgage interest 
deduction. The average income tax saving from 
this deduction peaks for middle-aged homeown-
ers, rising from $393 for households under the 
age of 35 to over $600 for those between 35 and 
65. For those over 65, the average property tax 
deduction falls to $242, reflecting both a decline 
in the deductions among older relative to younger 
households within each income subcategory, as 
well as a shift toward lower income categories 
and a corresponding decline in the probability 
of itemizing deductions. For this group, the tax 
savings from the property tax deduction sub-
stantially exceed those from the mortgage inter-
est deduction.
The last panel in Table 1 presents the change 
in income tax that would be associated with 
imputing rental income to homeowners using 
an economy-wide value for 1R/P2 . We assume 
that the average user cost in 2003, 6.0 percent, 
would be used to impute the gross rental value 
of owner-occupied homes, and that homeowners 
could then deduct 2.5 percent of their home value 
to reflect the cost of depreciation and mainte-
nance. By applying the average user cost under 
the current tax rules, we do not allow for the 
adjustment of R/P or the level of housing capital 
that would take place over time if the tax base 
included imputed rent. Taxing net imputed rent 
would lead to substantially higher tax burdens 
for homeowners. Average taxes would rise by 
almost $1,900, and age 501 households making 
$250,000 or more would owe $10,000 or more 
in additional taxes. These figures are lower 
for younger households and for poorer house-
holds—the lowest-income 25–35 age group 
would owe just $655 more than today—reflect-
ing lower income tax rates and house values.
Mortgage debt is concentrated among younger 
homeowners, and many older homeowners do not 
even have a mortgage. Consequently, many hom-
eowners would face only a modest tax increase, 
if any at all, if the mortgage interest deduction 
were disallowed. In contrast, virtually all hom-
eowners except those in the lowest income cat-
egories claim property tax deductions. Including 
imputed rental income in the definition of tax-
able income would also affect all homeowners. 
This suggests that the distribution of burdens 
from eliminating the property tax deduction is 
closer to that associated with taxing imputed 
rent than to that for reducing the mortgage inter-
est deduction, although the property tax deduc-
tion accounts for only one-quarter the revenue 
loss of the exclusion of imputed rent.
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